T hroughout the 20th century, improvements in agricultural productivity have considerably alleviated poverty and starvation and fueled economic progress. Further, a large body of evidence closely links productivity improvements to investments in agricultural research and development (R&D). 1 In the past several decades, however, many countries have made major changes in the way they fund and organize public agricultural R&D and the incentives affecting private R&D.These changes are reflected in the shifting patterns of support for agricultural R&D, reported here, raising questions about the prospects for sustaining productivity growth over the next several decades and beyond.
Total Science Spending
Agricultural R&D is not conducted in isolation from the rest of science. 2 Agricultural scientists have a long history of drawing on and adapting findings from the basic biological, chemical, and other sciences to further their own research, and scientific spillovers have flowed in the other direction as well. Moreover, given contemporary developments, particularly in the genetic and informational sciences, the boundaries between agriculture and other sciences are increasingly becoming blurred. Consequently, putting the agricultural sciences in the context of overall science spending is instructive.
In 2000, $731 billion was invested in all the sciences worldwide, 3 including research conducted by both public agencies and private firms.This represented about 1.7 percent of the world's $42.4 trillion gross domestic product (GDP) that year, and an increase of nearly onethird over the inflation-adjusted total of just five years earlier (Table 1) . Real spending in all regions of the world Table 1 increased between 1995 and 2000, but growth was uneven. 4 Of the developing countries, the most notable increases were in the Asia-Pacific and Middle East and North Africa regions, with hefty increases of 11.9 and 11.5 percent, respectively (the latter fueled by rapid spending increases in Israel and Turkey).While the overall average rate of growth for developing countries was 8.6 percent per year over the 1995-2000 timeframe, regional averages for developing countries ranged from lows of 1.9 percent per year for the "other developing countries" category (which includes several former Soviet states) and 3.0 percent per year for SubSaharan Africa, to notable highs of 19.7 percent per year for China and 12.2 percent per year for India. These regional trends hide a profoundly disturbing reality-evidence of a large and, in places, growing divide between the scientific haves and have-nots. For example, the overall growth in the Asia-Pacific region masks the fact that just two countries, China and India, accounted for 89 percent of the $42.5 billion increase in regional spending from 1995 to 2000. Put another way, China and India accounted for 59 percent of the region's scientific spending in 1995, jumping to 73 percent of the regional total by 2000. In contrast, while research spending in the seven Pacific countries (including Fiji, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and others) grew by as much as 9.4 percent annually from 1995, this was from an exceptionally small base, so their $120.7 million total in 2000 represents just a minuscule 0.13 percent of the Asia-Pacific region's total science spending.
Although geographically large and home to over 10 percent of the world's population, Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for just 0.5 percent of the world's gross investment in science. Further, South Africa, with less than 7 percent of this region's population, accounts for about two-thirds of the regional total for gross domestic expenditures on R&D.While 39 of the 44 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa for which data are available increased their investments in R&D between 1995 and 2000, South Africa accounted for about 61 percent of the nearly $1 billion increase.
Middle East and North Africa fared a bit better than Sub-Saharan Africa, with a real increase of R&D investment of almost 73 percent between 1995 and 2000. Indeed, the only country tracked in this region that reported a decrease in investment was Kuwait, with a period decline of almost 34 percent.As in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, the growth is highly concentrated, with Israel and Turkey alone accounting for almost 79 percent of the region's increase during this period.
The bifurcation in science spending is widespread, and these new data make the significant geopolitical concentration of science spending worldwide manifestly clear. In 2000, the top five countries (in descending order, the United States, Japan, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) accounted for 68.6 percent of the world's total science spending, and the two top spending countries alone (the United States and Japan) accounted for 63 percent of the total for Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries. 5 Expanding this group to the top 10 countries-which includes Italy, Canada, the lower income but fast-growing countries China and India, and South Korea-the share comes in at 81.6 percent of the world total. Moreover, the share of the bottom 80 countries (accounting for 11.1 percent of the world's population in 2000 but only 2.4 percent of global GDP) slipped from 0.29 percent of the global total in 1995 to 0.26 percent in 2000. Put together, this is evidence of a large and sustained, if not growing, gap between a comparatively small group of scientific haves and a substantial group of scientific have-nots. Converting research expenditures from different countries to a single currency using official exchange rates tends to understate the quantity of research resources used in economies with relatively low prices, while overstating the quantity of resources used in countries with high prices. a At present, there is no entirely satisfactory method for comparing consumption or expenditures among countries at different points in time (or for that matter, at the same point in time). Unfortunately, the choice of deflator and currency converter can have substantial consequences for both the measure obtained and its interpretation.
Most of the research expenditures in this report are denominated in 2000 "international dollars" using PPPs to do the currency conversions. b For convenience of interpretation, the reference currency-here an international dollar-is set equal to a U.S. dollar in the benchmark year. Figure B1 contrasts the regional expenditure shares both for public agricultural research expenditures using PPPs versus official exchange rates to do the currency conversion.The left-hand side of the figure denotes 2000 research spending in international dollars obtained using PPPs, while the right-hand side of the figure reports the U.S. dollar estimates obtained using the same underlying R&D data together with official exchange rates.Taking the PPP estimates to be more representative of the amount of resources committed to research, the U.S. dollar estimates overstate the share of developed-country agricultural research in the global total and grossly understate the African, Chinese, and other Asia-Pacific shares.
SOURCES: Pardey, Roseboom, Craig 1992;World Bank 2005b. a A country's international price level is the ratio of its PPP rate to its official currency exchange rate for U.S. dollars. In other words, the international price level is an index of the costs of goods in one country at the current rate of exchange relative to the costs of the same bundle of goods in a numeraire country, in this case the United States. For example, in 2000 the ratio of PPP to exchange rate for Australia was 0.77, indicating that average prices in Australia were 23 percent lower than they were in the United States.The corresponding ratio for Bangladesh was 0.22, meaning that a bundle of goods and services purchased for $100 in the United States cost only $22 dollars in Bangladesh. b We use a procedure described by Pardey, Roseboom, and Craig (1992) that first deflates research expenditures expressed in current local currency units to a base year set of prices (2000, in this case) using a local price deflator and then converts to a common currency unit (specifically, international dollars) using PPPs for 2000 obtained from the World Bank (2005b) rather than the more familiar official exchange rates. (Table 2 ).These data reveal a significant structural shift: during the 1990s, developing countries as a group undertook more of the world's public agricultural research than the developed countries. 6 The Asia-Pacific region has continued to gain ground, accounting for an ever-larger share of the 
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Public Agricultural R&D Research Spending Trends
Paralleling spending patterns for all the sciences, agricultural R&D has become increasingly concentrated in a handful of countries worldwide. Just four countries-the United States, Japan, France, and Germany-accounted for two-thirds of the public research done by rich countries in 2000, about the same as two decades before. Similarly, just five developing countries-China, India, Brazil,Thailand, and South Africa-undertook 53.3 percent of the developing world's public agricultural research in 2000, up from 40 (Table 3) . A shifting and widely disbursed pattern of growth is evident among regions ( Figure 1) . Certainly, the more recent rates of increase in inflation-adjusted spending for all developing regions of the world failed to match the rapid ramping up of public agricultural R&D spending of the 1970s (Pardey and Beintema 2001) .The growth in spending for the Asia-Pacific region held strong, averaging 4.3 percent per year in the 1980s and 3.9 percent per year in the decade to follow. Growth in China and India picked up in the late 1990s, in both instances reflecting government policies to revitalize public research and improve its commercialization prospects-including linkages with the private sector. 8 Spending growth throughout the Latin American region as whole was more robust during the 1990s than the 1980s, although the recovery was more fragile and less certain for some countries in the region (such as Brazil, where rates of spending contracted at the close of the 1990s, then partially recovered in 2000/01).
Overall investments in agricultural R&D in Sub-Saharan Africa failed to grow by more than 1 percent per year during the 1990s-the continuation of a longer run slowdown. Even more disturbing, about half of the 27 African countries for which national estimates were available spent less on agricultural R&D in 2000 than they did in 1991 (Beintema and Stads 2004) .
A notable feature of the growth trends is the contraction in support for public agricultural R&D among rich countries (Figure 1 occurred in Japan (and, to a lesser degree, several European countries) toward the end of the 1990s, leading to a decline (albeit small) in rich-country spending as a whole for the decade. Once again, these new data reinforce the longer run trends observed earlier-namely, a fairly widespread scaling back, or at best a slowing down of support for publicly performed agricultural research among rich countries. In part, this points to a shifting emphasis from publicly to privately performed agricultural R&D, and to a shift in government spending priorities. Inevitably, this will affect productivity prospects in agriculture for the countries in question. In addition, as Pardey, Alston, and Piggott (2006) suggest (and as is discussed in more detail later in this report), a more subtle and arguably more important consequence is that slowdowns or cutbacks in rich-country spending will curtail the future spillovers of ideas and new technologies from rich to poor countries.These rich-poor country linkages will be even more attenuated as the funding trends proceed in parallel with other policy and market developments, like strengthening intellectual property rights and biosafety regulations and a reorientation of rich-country R&D away from productivity gains in food staples toward concerns over the environmental effects of agriculture, as well as the food quality, medical, energy, and industrial applications of agricultural commodities.While this research is likely to generate substantial economic value, the fact that developed countries, as a group, still account for nearly 41 percent of public agricultural R&D worldwide (and almost 80 percent of all science spending) means the consequences of such continued funding, policy, and market trends could be particularly pronounced in terms of the productivity-enhancing effects on food staples.
The broad trends documented here mask many of the aspects of agricultural R&D funding that have important practical consequences. For example, undue variability in research funding continues to be problematic for many developing-country research agencies.This is especially troubling for agricultural R&D, given the long gestation period for new crop varieties and livestock breeds and the desirability of long-term employment assurances for scientists and other staff (Pardey,Alston, and Piggott 2006) . Variability encourages an overemphasis on short-term projects or those with short lags between investment and outcomes, and adoption. It also discourages specialization of scientists and other resources in areas of work where sustained funding may be uncertain, even when these areas have high payoff potentials.
Institutional Orientation
In this report, public agricultural research includes research performed by government, higher education, and nonprofit agencies. 9 There are substantial differences among countries and between regions in the structure of the public research sector ( the total in 1996 (the latest year for which an 11-country total is available).This is similar to the government agency share in our 27-country Sub-Saharan African total. Like Latin America, a small but growing proportion of public research in Sub-Saharan Africa is conducted by nonprofit institutions; in 2000, for example, they accounted for 3 percent of total agricultural research staff ( Figure 2 ). Nonprofit institutions are often managed by independent boards not directly under government control. Many are closely linked to producer organizations from which they receive the lion's share of their funding, typically by way of taxes levied on production or exports. Examples include agencies conducting research on tea (Kenya,Tanzania, Malawi), coffee (Uganda, Kenya,Tanzania), cotton (Zambia), and sugar (Mauritius, South Africa). Noteworthy is the establishment of various other forms of nonprofit institutions, not linked to producer organizations, in a number of countries, such as Madagascar and Togo.
In 2000, of the full-time equivalent (fte) researchers working in nonprofit institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, Madagascar, Mauritius, and South Africa (the southern African region) employed about three-quarters.Togo was the only country in West Africa to employ researchers in nonprofit agencies, according to the available data, but they totaled only 9 fte researchers in 2001. Although the number of fte researchers working for nonprofit agencies throughout Sub-Saharan Africa has increased considerably, the rate of growth was less than in the corresponding government and higher education sectors, with the result that the nonprofit researcher share was smaller in 2000 than three decades earlier.
The continuing scarcity and comparatively small size of national agricultural science institutions throughout Africa has spurred attempts to strengthen subregional research coordination and implementation capacities in western, eastern, and southern Africa. 10 These regional efforts were conceived to stimulate knowledge and technology spillovers among countries within regions, improve the capacity to search for and obtain access to new knowledge and technologies from further afield, achieve economies of scope and scale in the conduct of research, coalesce a critical mass of local scientific expertise around regional priorities (which are not necessarily the sum of national priorities), and achieve these aims in the face of persistent national funding vagaries and the ravages of HIV/AIDS on scientific capacity within the region.
Typically, research activities have been organized as (sub)regional research networks coordinated by a regional scientific research organization (for example, the Association for Strengthening Agricultural Research in East and Central Africa [ASARECA]). A good number of these networks were originally established and managed by centers of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR or CG). For many of the same reasons behind the subregional networks developed around national research capacities, the CGIAR is also in the process of reconstituting its own African efforts through joint subregional programs between relevant CG centers, scientific research organizations, and national research agencies. Integrated CGIAR medium-term investment plans for eastern and central Africa, for example, are now well advanced.
The extent to which these new institutional arrangements have increased funding for Sub-Saharan African research is unclear, if not questionable. 11 Even in the absence of increased funding, the hope is that these regionalized arrangements will improve the relevance and harmonization of R&D efforts sufficient to realize more cost-effective research (via enhancing spillovers, achieving a critical mass, and reducing R&D lag times), thereby increasing the regional and national benefits from research.A pessimistic view is that these regional arrangements serve merely to redirect money otherwise committed to national and international research, while at the same time increasing transaction costs and the earmarking of research funds in ways that undermine research efficiencies. Indeed, it is unclear if many of the arrangements already in place (or those contemplated) substantially alter the existing incentives to innovate (and to mobilize funding for that innovation), such that the same problems that gave rise to an underfunding of national research will simply be compounded by strategic behavior among agencies now also operating in regional institutional frameworks. 12
Research Intensities
Turning now from absolute to relative measures of R&D investments, developed countries as a group spent $2.36 on public agricultural R&D for every $100 of agricultural output in 2000, a sizable increase over the $1.41 they spent per $100 of output two decades earlier but, notably, slightly down from the 1991 estimate of $2.38 ( Figure 3 ). This longer run rise in research intensity starkly contrasts with the group of developing countries, where since 1981 there has been no measurable growth in the intensity of agricultural research (that is, agricultural R&D spending expressed as a percentage of agricultural gross domestic product [AgGDP] ). In 2000, the developing world spent just 53 cents on public agricultural R&D for every $100 of agricultural output.
At first glance, the combined rise in rich-country intensity ratios and the stagnating research intensities for poor countries belies the evidence presented in Figure 1 , where the growth in overall investments in agricultural R&D in poor countries (3.1 percent per year from 1981 to 2000) significantly outpaced the rise in spending by rich countries (1.1 percent per year). Delving deeper, agricultural output grew much faster in aggregate for developing versus developed countries over the past several decades, so that the faster growth in aggregate agricultural research spending among poor countries has, nonetheless, barely kept pace with the corresponding growth in output. In other words, the scientific or knowledge intensity of agricultural production grew at a much faster rate in rich relative to poor countries; indeed, the intensity gap has grown over the past several decades. 13 In addition, more than half of the developed countries for which data were available had higher research intensity ratios in 2000 than they did in 1981, and the majority of them spent in excess of $2.30 on public agricultural R&D for every $100 of AgGDP. However, only 10 of the 26 Sub-Saharan countries in our sample had higher 2000 intensity ratios than in 1981, although most countries in our Asian and Latin American samples (9 of 11 Asian countries and 7 of 11 Latin American countries) increased their intensity ratios over the 1981-2000 period. 14 Other research intensity ratios are also revealing (Table 4) . Rich countries spent $692 per agricultural worker in 2000, more than double the corresponding 1981 ratio. Poor countries spent just $10 per agricultural worker in 2000, substantially less than double the 1981 figure.These rich/poor country differences are, perhaps, not too surprising.A much smaller share of the richcountry workforce is employed in agriculture, and the absolute number of agricultural workers declined more rapidly in rich countries than it did in the poor ones.
While only some segments of society are directly involved in agriculture as producers, everyone consumes agricultural outputs, and so a look at agricultural R&D spending per capita is instructive.These new data signal a break from earlier trends. 
Spending per Scientist
Agricultural R&D spending grew comparatively quickly in many parts of the developing world during the 1980s, but not fast enough to outpace the corresponding growth in the number of scientists.After adjusting for inflation and cross-country differences in price levels, average spending per fte scientist for a sample of 27 Sub-Saharan African countries fell quite markedly from $190,000 (2000 international dollars) in 1981 to $132,000 two decades later (Figure 4 ).The fall was less pronounced, but evident nonetheless, for the 11 Latin American and Caribbean countries for which timeseries data were available.Throughout the 1990s, real spending per scientist stabilized somewhat, although it drifted down slightly in Sub-Saharan Africa with signs of a slight recovery in Latin America.These regional averages inevitable obscure important country-specific details. For example, the 1980s decline in support per scientist was much more pronounced in Nigeria and Paraguay compared with their respective regional averages.
Developing-country patterns (with a few exceptions) markedly contrast developments in the United States. U.S. public-sector spending per fte grew steadily from an average of $222,017 (2000 prices) in 1981 to $356,911 in 2000-a 2.6 percent increase per year in the real resources available per researcher. Of course, not all states tracked the U.S. average trend. Spending per scientist in some states (including Delaware, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina) grew by less than 1 percent per year, while 10 states grew faster than 4 percent annually. Moreover, after adjusting for price-level differences between countries, spending per scientist in some developing countries (such as South Africa) are comparable with U.S. levels.
Public Versus Private Agricultural R&D
For almost all of agriculture's 10,000 year history, innovation was mainly a private, individual undertaking. Improved crop varieties, livestock breeds, and farm management practices were typically the result of farmer experimentation-adapting and developing earlier ideas, then passing on inventions to siblings, children, and fellow farmers. Collectively conceived and funded public research did not begin until the early to mid-1700s as part of the efforts of the agrarian societies that formed throughout the United Kingdom and Europe at that time. From these institutional roots, the publicly funded and operated agricultural experiment stations developed around the mid-1800s. But even as public agricultural R&D took off, private agricultural R&D continued to flourish. It too evolved, from the tinkering and trial-anderror efforts of many individuals-most operating alone-to large-scale input supply firms investing in their own private R&D facilities. For example, in U.S. agriculture alone, Eli Whitney patented the cotton gin, Cyrus McCormick's mechanical reaper "made bread cheap," John Deere's steel-tipped moldboard plows helped tame the prairies, and Hiram Moore built the first combined harvester (combining a reaper and a thresher in one machine).The list of biological innovators is less wellknown, but the legendary Luther Burbank-who developed scores of new and improved varieties, many of which still bear his name-is representative of thousands of farmer-scientists who, by careful selection and in some cases hybridization, improved the plant varieties available to American farmers. 16 Particularly in agriculture, however, it is difficult for individuals to fully appropriate the returns from their research investments, and it is widely held that some government action is warranted to ensure an adequate investment in R&D to fully capture the public good (Pardey, Alston and Piggott 2006) .The private sector has continued to emphasize inventions that are amenable to various intellectual property protection options such as patents, and more recently, plant breeders' rights and other forms of intellectual property. 17 Private investments in agricultural R&D, like investments in all forms of research, are motivated and sustained by the returns to innovation reaped by that investment. Intellectual property policies and practices are but one dimension of the incentive to innovate. Potential market size and the cost of servicing the market-in turn dependent on the state of communication and transportation infrastructure, farm structure and size, and farm income-are important dimensions as well. So too is the pattern of food consumption.As incomes rise, larger shares of the food expenditures go toward food processing, convenience, and other attributes of food-areas where significant shares of private agricultural research effort are directed.
A large private presence is evident in agricultural R&D, but with dramatic differences between rich and poor, and among individual, countries (Table 5 ). In 2000, global spending on agricultural R&D (including prefarm-, onfarm-, and postfarm-oriented R&D) was $36.0 billion-about 36 percent of which was performed by private firms and the remaining 64 percent by public agencies. Notably, about 93 percent of that private R&D was performed in rich countries, where some 54 percent of the agricultural R&D is private. In developing countries, only 6 percent of the agricultural R&D is private and there are large disparities in the private share among regions of the developing world. In the Asia-Pacific region, nearly 8 percent of the agricultural R&D is private compared with only 2 percent of the research throughout Sub-Saharan Africa.
The majority of private R&D in Sub-Saharan Africa was oriented to crop-improvement research, often (but not always) dealing with export crops, such as cotton (in Zambia and Madagascar) and sugarcane (in Sudan and Uganda).Virtually all the firms are small, both in terms of total spending and numbers of researchers.They involve a mix of locally owned companies (for example, Pannar Seeds in Greytown, South Africa, or Kenana Sugar Company in Sudan), as well as local affiliates of multinational companies. Moreover, almost two-thirds of the private research performed throughout the whole region was done in South Africa. Given the tenuous market realities facing much of African agriculture, it is unrealistic to expect marked and rapid development of locally conducted private R&D.That said, there is substantial potential, perhaps, for tapping into private agricultural R&D done elsewhere-maybe through creative public-private joint ventures. (Table 6 ).This trend may well continue if the science of agriculture increasingly looks like the sciences more generally. In the United States, for example, the private sector conducted nearly 52 percent of agricultural R&D in 2000 compared with 72 percent of all R&D expenditures that same year (NSF 2005) .
The rich/poor country disparity in the intensity of agricultural research (noted in Figure 3 ) is magnified dramatically if private research is also factored in ( Figure 5 ). In 2000, developing countries as a group had an agricultural R&D intensity ratio of 0.56 percent (that is, for every $100 of agricultural GDP, 56 cents was spent on agricultural R&D) compared with a ratio of 5.16 percent for developed countries.This results in a rich-versus poor-country intensity ratio of 9.2:1 compared with a 4.5:1 ratio if just public research spending were considered. Most agricultural technologies are sensitive to local climate, soil, and other biophysical attributes, making them less easily transferable than other types of technologies, such as those arising from the medical or information sciences. For example, soybeans are day-length sensitive, so different varieties must be developed for different latitudes. Likewise, many tropical soils are naturally acidic, a less prevalent problem in temperate areas; consequently, crops that thrive in temperate soils can fail or falter under tropical conditions.Variability in the agroecological basis of agriculture means that imported technologies often have to be adapted to local conditions before they can be used (as was usually the case with Green Revolution wheat and rice varieties). Nevertheless, for some developing countries and for some types of technologies, the least-cost option has been to import and adapt technology-and this will continue to be so.
However, while the importance of technology spillover is well recognized, it has often proved difficult to incorporate technology transfer potentials into strategic research-planning perspectives. In part, this simply stems from the limited (informed) use of new sources of data on the distribution of key biophysical attributes of the world's agricultural production environments. Figure 6 (see page 12) provides an agroecological typology of the world's cultivated systems, going beyond the purely rainfall and temperature attributes that, for example, underpinned the agroclimatic characterization by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO 1978-81 ) and the early agroecologically based efforts of the CGIAR (CGIAR/TAC 1991).The typology shown here extends these prior efforts by adding the important distinction between irrigated and rainfed lands, and sloping and flat lands. Furthermore, the map focuses attention on the actual rather than potential area of cultivated production. Such attributes bring greater geographic specificity to the search for homologous production conditions as a basis for spillins (looking for potential sources of improved knowledge and technology from locations with similar production environments that could be applied locally) or spillouts (taking innovative ideas and technologies known to be successful locally and searching for locations with similar production environments to which the innovations might be transferable).
The regional distribution of agroecological attributes of the world's cultivated systems is presented in the top half of Table 7 . Despite the highly aggregated evidence presented, these data suggest scope for potentially significant technology spillover possibilities. 19 For example, the moderately cool tropics and subtropical areas that typify some 14.5 percent of the cultivated area in Sub-Saharan Africa also comprise significant shares of the cultivated systems of Brazil, China, and even the United States. Similarly, the warm tropics and subtropics-flat, rainfed areas that form the greater share of the area in SubSaharan Africa-also represent a significant share of the cultivated agriculture in Brazil and India. Increasingly, specific screening criteria-by adding soil characteristics, climate variability, and the like-could be applied in order to delineate increasingly focused geographic domains that might offer opportunities for technology spillover.
There are several ways of exploring the use of spatially explicit information to help guide the search for inward or outward looking technology spillover opportunities. Figure 7 (see page 13) illustrates the spatial incidence of different biophysical suitabilities for the rainfed production of spring wheat (Panel A) and rice (Panel B). Again, being more specific about the attributes of production subsystems and technologies (for example, saline-tolerant lowland rice varieties) would allow the geography of potential spillover opportunities to be more sharply defined. 20 An interesting feature of the two panels, even with this highly aggregated agroecological characterization, is the distinct spatial pattern in the potential production geographies of the two crops. Areas evidently suitable for spring wheat, a Agroecologies and Research Spillovers T he spending figures previously presented refer to national investments, but agricultural innovation need not be homegrown. A striking feature of the history of agricultural development is that agricultural science and technology spillovers have been pervasive both within and among countries. 18 The result is that agricultural technologies move across borders, both by design and by accident. Spillovers extend beyond agricultural technologies that can be adapted to local conditions to include the underlying knowledge and scientific research.
crop typically better adapted to temperate climates, do not coincide spatially with those (largely tropical and subtropical) areas suitable for growing rainfed rice.
The broad global extent of cultivated lands depicted in Figure 6 (whose limits are inferred from satellitederived data on actual land cover, and whose agroecological composition is summarized in the top half of Table 7) , represents the outcome of a complex interaction between agroecological (biophysical) factors that condition production potential (as indicated for wheat and rice in Figure 7 ) and a host of socioeconomic, demographic, cultural, and policy factors that have shaped the realization of that potential.The bottom half of Table 7 summarizes a novel dataset on the actual spatial incidence of agricultural (that is, crop and livestock) production at the turn of the millennium. Production is summarized in terms of aggregate value, derived as the product of location-specific estimates of production quantities (annual average for 1999-2001) weighted by average world commodity prices (annual average for 1989-91) denominated in international dollars for FAO's production database commodities (Cassman et al. 2005 ). Table B2 and mapped in Figure  B2 One striking feature of Figure B2 is the geographically widespread extent of potentially drought-prone areas. In some places rainfed production risks can be mitigated by irrigation (separate breakdowns show that drought risks are higher in predominantly irrigated compared with predominantly rainfed areas, and in sloping compared with flat lands). In general, high drought risk is two to four times more common in drier cropland areas, and in the most drought-prone group of agroecosystems-namely, cool/cold, semi-arid, tropics, and subtropics-around three-quarters of the cropland extent is deemed to have highly variable rainfall (although, collectively these agroecosystems represent only 5 percent of global cropland). The second most drought-prone agroecosystem is the drier temperate croplands (comprising some 16 percent of the global cropland total) where almost 70 percent of the area is subject to a high risk of drought.About two-thirds of the cropland of Eastern Europe falls into this category.The least drought-impacted agroecosystem, the warm humid tropics and subtropics, constituting over one-quarter of cropland globally, suffers from highly variable rainfall on only 10 percent of its extent. From a regional perspective, the Middle East/North Africa and Eastern Europe regions appear the most affected, with over half their cropland exposed to high drought risk. Table B2 reveals some surprising results. Over 90 percent of the dry (arid, semi-arid) temperate cropland in the United States (which is almost 15 percent of U.S. cropland) is categorized as high water-stress risk. Overall, more than 40 percent of U.S. cultivated lands appears to be exposed to inherently high rainfall variability.While reference to the long-term mean LGP must be an integral part of an interregional comparison of water stress conditions, clearly investments in irrigation and welltargeted agronomic practices play a large role in mitigating the potentially negative impacts of this variability. c In SubSaharan Africa, a region plagued by drought and famine, the results suggest that of the two largest agroecosystems-the humid (38 percent) and the dry (43 percent) warm tropics and subtropics, together representing over 80 percent of the region's total cropland-only 4 percent and 30 percent, respectively, exhibit high water-stress variability.Again, lower average LGP conditions are clearly associated with greater variability in water availability. One potential source of these intuitively low estimates of the incidence of water stress in the region is the weakness of satellite-derived assessments of the cropland extent in Africa.The small and often diffuse agricultural land holdings in both wetter and drier areas are poorly discriminated by the type of medium-resolution sensors used to derive the global land cover data used in this analysis. However, as shown in Figure B2 , a broader perspective of agricultural land, including pasture and grazing areas (which undoubtedly contain many cropped holdings undetected by the satellite sensors) together with areas designated as cropland, reveals that a large share of the agricultural area of the Sahel and eastern and southern Africa is clearly predisposed to high drought risk. Table 7 for area shares of each region by agroecosystem (physical area share of the region exposed to high risk is the product of the area shares in Table 7 and the high risk share in this table). Cells are blank if area shares reported in Table 7 are less than 1 percent of the regional/country total. A zero entry indicates an area share greater than 1 percent, but there are no high drought risks. Significant differences are found in the spatial patterns of agricultural areas and the value of agricultural production.Whereas more than 35 percent of the world's agricultural area is found in the semi-arid/arid temperate zones and the humid/subhumid cool tropics/subtropics (columns 2 and 3 of Table 7 , respectively) these zones contribute only 15 percent of the world's agricultural production value. It is estimated that over 40 percent of the value of agricultural output comes from the humid/subhumid warm tropics/subtropics (column 5 in Table 7 , a zone that accounts for only 26 percent of the world's agricultural area), with a further 33 percent of agricultural value generated in the humid/subhumid temperate zone (column 1 in Table 7 ). Notably, both these tropical and temperate zones include substantial irrigated areas.This discordance between the physical area allocated to agriculture and the value of production each area generates persists across most regions of the world. An important implication of these new data is that it could be misleading to use area allocation as the sole production-related criterion for targeting agricultural research, thereby ignoring the agroecological and economic realities that clearly have a dominant effect on the spatial distribution of production value.
Importantly, both the supply and demand for spillover technologies appears to be changing. Notably, rich countries are reorienting their agricultural R&D away from the types of technologies that are most easily adapted and adopted by developing countries (Pardey, Alston, and Piggott 2006) . In addition, intellectual property rights and other regulatory policies-including biosafety protocols, trading regimes, and specific regulatory restrictions on the movement of genetic materialare increasingly influencing the extent to which such spillovers are feasible or economic.
Some developing countries have expanded their own research capacity and shifted upstream, reducing their emphasis on adaptive R&D (examples include the largest developing countries: Brazil, China, and India).These countries have become a potential source of new technologies for the poorest and smallest countries, which will (or often should, given economic realities in the current and foreseeable future) continue to emphasize adaptive research. 
CGIAR Trends
The nominal and real (that is, adjusted for inflation) values of total expenditures for the CGIAR are shown in Figure 8 .The CG system began modestly. Between 1960 and 1964 , of the institutes that would become the CG, only IRRI was operating as such.After an initial expenditure of US$7.4 million in 1960, total spending rose to $1.3 million per year in 1965. By 1970, the four founding centers-IRRI, CIMMYT, IITA, and CIAT-were allocated a total of $14.8 million annually. 21 The progressive expansion of the total number of centers and the funding per center during the next decade involved a 10-fold increase in nominal spending, to $141 million in 1980. During the 1980s, spending continued to grow, more than doubling in nominal terms to reach $305 million in 1990.The rate of growth had slowed but was still impressive. In the 1990s, however, although the number of centers grew-from 13 to 18 at one point, but now 15-funding did not grow enough to maintain the level of spending per center, let alone the growth rates. Since 2000, funding has grown in total but with a continuing trend toward earmarked support for specific projects and programs of research involving multiple centers and other research providers outside the CG.
In the early years of plenty, all the centers grew together, but even during the bountiful 1970s and 1980s, when all of the centers grew, they did not all grow at the same rate.A notable trend has been the declining share of the four founding centers. In 1971, these four centers accounted for 100 percent of the allocation. By 1980, their share had slipped to 54 percent, and by 2004 it was down to 36 percent. During the stagnation of the 1990s, nine centers experienced a nominal decline in support, including the four founders-IRRI, CIAT, CIMMYT, and IITA-along with CIP, ICRISAT, ILRI (formerly ILCA and ILRAD), ICARDA, and ISNAR. 22 The centers being downgraded also tended to be the larger centers.Among the pre-1990 centers, the International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI) grew the fastest, with its funding more than doubling in just five years. Of the new entrants, the two forestry institutes showed the greatest gains.These broad trends indicate that, through both the addition of new centers and the allocation of funds among centers, the agenda of the CG shifted dramatically away from its original focus, especially in the 1990s.
In its early years, virtually all CG funding came in the form of unrestricted support (wherein the funds were earmarked by center and spending within a center was largely at the discretion of center management).This remained the dominant mode of funding for the CGIAR average of 81.2 percent (and a 1970s average of 88.2 percent for the precursor centers of the CG).This decline since the early 1980s has two distinct phases. For the period through to 1987, the unrestricted share fell, while total funding for the CG (in real terms) continued to rise. For the period thereafter, both real funding and the unrestricted share declined, partly reflecting the fact that most of the newly admitted centers in the 1990s joined with comparatively small shares of unrestricted support (unlike the wave of new entrants that joined during the 1970s).The corollary to the decline in the share of unrestricted funding is a rise in the share of funds earmarked for specific purposes. 
Aid for Agricultural R&D
After several decades of strong support, international funding for agriculture and agricultural research began to decline around the mid-1980s, as support for economic infrastructure as well as health, education, and other social services began to grow. Data on aggregate trends are simply not available, but information on agricultural R&D grants and loans from the World Bank and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is obtainable.
The amount of funding that USAID directed toward agricultural research conducted by national agencies in less-developed countries declined by 75 percent in inflation-adjusted terms from the mid Figure 9a indicate that USAID committed just $15 million to nationally performed agricultural R&D for the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa. Over the past two decades,World Bank lending to the rural sector has been erratic, but after adjusting for inflation, the general trend has been downward. Agriculture's share of total lending has also declined (from an average of 26 percent during the first half of the 1980s to only 10 percent by 2000).There is no discernable pattern in the amount of World Bank lending authorized for agricultural R&D, other than a temporary increase in loan approvals in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and an exceptionally large amount of lending in 1998 resulting mostly from loans with large research components approved for India ($136 million, current prices), China ($68 million), and Ethiopia ($60 million) ( Figure 9 , Panel B).The size of the loans has been highly variable, ranging from $0.1 million for Argentina in 1992 and Niger in 1997, to $136 million for India in 1998.
Sub-Saharan Africa
The era of substantial donor support for agricultural R&D in Sub-Saharan Africa appears to be drawing to a close-with certainty if recent trends continue. Donor contributions (including World Bank loans) accounted for an average of 35 percent of funding to principal agricultural research agencies in 2000. Pardey and Beintema (2001) estimated that five years earlier, close to half the agricultural research funding in the region was derived from donor contributions (Figure 10 ). These regional averages mask great variation among countries. In 2000, donor funding accounted for more than half of the agricultural R&D funding in 7 of the 23 sample countries. Eritrea, in particular, was highly dependent on donor contributions. Its principal agricultural research agency received more than three-quarters of its funding from donors. In contrast, donor funding was quite insignificant in Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, and Sudan (less than 5 percent). From the mid-1990s to 2000, onethird of the sample countries experienced declines of 10 percent or more in the donors' share of total agricultural R&D funding, while the share of funding from donor sources increased by at least 10 percent for four countries (namely, Burundi, Gambia,Tanzania, and Togo). Notably, donor funding fell from over 50 percent of the total to 10 percent or less for Malawi, Niger, and Sudan, as a result of the completion of major projects funded by World Bank loans or contributions from the FAO.
Funding from nongovernment or donor sources, such as internally generated revenues, was comparatively small, representing just 11 percent of total funding in 2000.The exceptions are Benin and Côte d'Ivoire.The principal agricultural research agencies in these two countries generated significant shares of total funding from research contracts, commercialization of agricultural products, and dissemination of research results. In some cases, this practice was dictated by the terms of the international loans for agricultural R&D. For example, in Côte d'Ivoire, the World Bank's second National Agricultural Services Support Project (PNASA II) had an important commercialization component, stipulating that 35 percent of the annual budget of the National Agricultural Research Center (CNRA) was to be selfgenerated through mechanisms such as commodity sales (Beintema and Stads 2004) .
Implications
There are substantial and potentially profound changes under way regarding agricultural R&D worldwide. Global investments in agricultural research have continued to grow, albeit at a much slower rate in the 1990s than in previous decades.These new data suggest a global bifurcation in the conduct of agricultural R&D, with a select few developing countries showing signs of closing in on the higher amounts and higher intensity of investment in agricultural R&D typically found in the rich countries. Meanwhile, a large number of developing countries are either stalling or slipping in terms of the amount spent on agricultural R&D, the intensity of investment, or both.The private sector maintains a big presence in the rich countries and a growing presence in a small number of developing countries where agricultural input markets are growing and becoming more costeffective to service.
In 2000, 80 developing countries in the world got by with a combined total of just $1.4 billion of public agricultural R&D spending (about 6.3 percent of the global total). By way of comparison, more than 35 public universities in the United States each spent in excess of this amount in 2004. Increasing the amount spent on agricultural R&D in low-income countries that are heavily reliant on agriculture is likely to be a wise, but difficult, investment given the pressing demands on the cash-strapped governments in these economies (Runge et al. 2003) . However, simply maintaining current agricultural R&D policies could leave many developing countries as agricultural technology orphans in the decades ahead. Developing countries may have to become more selfreliant and perhaps more dependent on one another for the collective goods of agricultural R&D and technology (Pardey,Alston, and Piggott 2006) . Some of the more advanced developing countries like Brazil, China, India, and South Korea seem to be gaining ground, with productive and self-sustaining local research sectors taking hold. However, other parts of the developing world, like Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Zambia, are merely regaining lost ground or slipping further behind.Aside from a handful of larger countries, significant numbers of developing countries, especially in Africa, continue to face serious funding and institutional constraints that inhibit the effectiveness of local R&D.Together these factors may spell serious food deficits for some of these countries.
Achieving the rate of agricultural productivity gains necessary to feed the generally faster-than-average growing populations in the poorer parts of the world requires giving much more explicit attention to tapping and adapting technologies developed elsewhere and better targeting of those technologies to maximize local food-security and agricultural development impact. However, the shifting scientific orientation of rich-country research, combined with changing biosafety and intellectual property regimes internationally, suggests that the technology spillover pathways of the past may not carry forward, even to the near future. New institutional arrangements (including improving the allocation and efficiency with which scarce agricultural R&D funds are deployed) will likely be required-and are possible, if the pipeline of agricultural technologies useful for poorcountry farmers is to be kept fully primed.
11. It is likely that the national and international R&D trends presented above (based on a research performers) and below (based on development assistance for research) capture the vast majority of subregional expenditures on agricultural R&D, irrespective of the mode of allocating and conducting the research.The overall trend, at least through to 2000, indicates a continuing slowdown in total support for African agricultural R&D.
12. Cross-country collective action to conceive and conduct research, absent counterpart institutional innovation to generate and allocate funding for regional research, may be of little positive consequence.The Regional Fund for Agricultural Technology (FONTAGRO)-established in 1998 as a competitive, regional mechanism to support research and innovation throughout Latin America and the Caribbean-is a creative example of one such funding mechanism. FONTAGRO has channeled a total of US$9.5 million (not counting $2 million available for the current, 2006, call for proposals) as direct support to projects, with regional organizations and others providing approximately $21 million in counterpart funding.This is well below the funding expectations for this initiative, underscoring the reluctance of national governments (and others) to cede funds for regional research, even if they are the potential beneficiaries of that research. Binenbaum and Pardey (2005) , for example, describe a range of complex incentive problems that befall collective action in crop breeding research.
17. Wright et al. (2006) provide a more comprehensive treatment of the forms of intellectual property protection used in agriculture worldwide.
18. Assessing the formal impact evaluation literature, Alston (2002) contends that up to half the local productivity gains in agriculture over the past several decades are attributable to the effects of spillin technologies developed elsewhere. For example, Pardey et al. (1996) showed that research conducted on wheat and rice by the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) and the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), respectively, almost entirely in developing countries, provided very large economic benefits to the U.S. wheat and rice sectors. This was as a consequence of technology spillover, where wheat and rice varieties generated for developing-country farmers could either be adopted directly by U.S. farmers or, more often, be incorporated into U.S.-focused crop improvement programs. See also Evenson and Gollin (2003) .
19. The table presents agroecological attributes aggregated to 6 classes.These are derived from the 14 classes shown in Figure 6 , which in turn is a summary of more disaggregated attributes. Using geographical information system (GIS) tools, the degree of aggregation of the agroecological data can be varied so as to best match the nature of the technology investment and development decisions being assessed. 
